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THE REQUIREMENT OF INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION: AN
END TO INS FACTORY SWEEPS?
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union,
AFL-CIO v. Sureck
681 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1872 (1983)
CATHY ANN POHL, 1984*
The problem of growing numbers of illegal aliens' entering and
remaining in this country is one of national concern. 2 It is estimated
that there are between three and six million illegal aliens currently in
this country.
3
In an attempt to locate illegal aliens, the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service 4 has been conducting a series of searches through
factories commonly called factory sweeps.5 These searches have been
carried out under the authority of section 1357 of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act which empowers immigration officers without a
warrant "to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to
* B.A., Psychology, University of Rochester, 1976; M.A., Social Service Administration,
University of Chicago, 1978; Candidate for J.D., lIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1984.
1. "Illegal alien" refers to aliens who have entered this country and/or are found to be in
this country in violation of the laws of the United States. Any alien who enters the country with-
out inspection, aliens who overstay their visas and passes, and any others who enter or remain in
the United States in violation of immigration, and other laws are illegal aliens. ILGWU v.
Sureck, 681 F.2d 624, 626 n.l (9th Cir. 1982). See also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543 (1976).
2. Congressional hearings on the problem showed that the influx of illegal aliens has an
adverse impact on the national labor market because they:
I) Take jobs which would reasonably be filled by American workers;
2) Depress the wages and impair the working conditions of American citizens;
3) Compete with unskilled and uneducated American citizens... ;
4) Increase the burden on American taxpayers through added welfare cost;
5) Reduce the effectiveness of employee organizations; and
6) Constitute for employers a group of workers highly susceptible for exploitation.
Chapman, Illega/Aliens and Enforcement.- Present Practices and Proposed Legislation, 8 U.C.D.L.
REV. 127-28 n. 13 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Chapman]. See generally Goodpaster, llegal Immi-
gration, ARIZ. ST. L.J. 651 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Goodpaster].
3. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). See also United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 901
(1975).
4. Hereinafter referred to as the INS.
5. Factory sweeps are also called "factory surveys" and the terms will be used interchangea-
bly throughout this Comment. See infra note 119 for a description of a typical factory sweep.
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his right to be or to remain in the United States .... ,,6 The Act has
given immigration officers broad statutory enforcement powers to pre-
vent unlawful entry and to detect and arrest aliens who enter or remain
in the country illegally.7 Recent court decisions, however, reflect grow-
ing judicial awareness of the potential conflict between the breadth of
the Act and the constitutional protections afforded by the fourth
amendment.8 Recognizing that aliens and illegal aliens alike are pro-
tected by the Constitution,9 courts are beginning to address the issue.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently
addressed the constitutionality of factory sweeps under the fourth
amendment. In International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-
CIO v. Sureck, t0 the Ninth Circuit decided that the factory surveys
were seizures recognized under the fourth amendment."l Further, the
Ninth Circuit determined that the sweeps did not comply with the rea-
sonableness standard 12 required by the fourth amendment for detentive
6. 8 U.S.C. §1357(a)(1980) [hereinafter referred to as section 1357 or the Act] reads in part:
(a) Any officer or employee of the Service authorized under regulations prescribed by
the Attorney General shall have power without warrant-
(1) to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or
to remain in the United States...
(3) within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States,
to board and search for aliens any vessel within the territorial waters of the
United States and any railway car, aircraft, conveyance, or vehicle, and within
a distance of twenty-five miles from any such external boundary to have access
to private lands, but not dwellings, for the purpose of patrolling the border to
prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the United States; and...
7. See Fragomen, Searching for Illegal Aliens.- The Immigration Service Encounters the
Fourth Amendment, 13 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 82, 95 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Fragomen].
8. The fourth amendment of the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CO ST. amend. IV.
9. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), a case involving the rights of illegal alien children
to public education. The Court states "Whatever his [undocumented alien] status under the immi-
gration laws, an alien is surely a 'person' in any ordinary sense of that term. Aliens, even aliens
whose presence in this country is unlawful have long been recognized as 'persons' guaranteed due
process by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 4652. The fourth amendment states
right of the people . . . " and courts have thus interpreted this to mean legal or illegal
aliens alike. United States v. Barbera, 514 F.2d 294, 296 n.3 (2d Cir. 1975).
10. 681 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1982).
11. Id. at 629-35.
12. Reasonableness under the fourth amendment derives its meaning from the fourth amend-
ment's wording that "the right of the people [is] to be secure ... against unreasonable searches
and seizures... " U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. (emphasis added). The Constitution does not pro-
hibit all searches and seizures, but only those which are unreasonable. Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). See generally Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and the Law of Arrest, 54
J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 393, 396-403 (1963). In order to assess reasonableness, it is necessary:
'[f]irst to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion
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questioning. 13 The court held that to be reasonable, the detention must
be based on a specific and individualized suspicion that the alien is ille-
gally in this country.'
4
This case comment will analyze the Ninth Circuit decision in light
of current fourth amendment law. It will be shown that the fourth
amendment required the result reached by the Ninth Circuit. The
comment also will address the implications and problems the Sureck
decision creates for the INS in their attempt to enforce immigration
laws at a time when the problem of illegal aliens in this country is
rampant. ' 5
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Supreme Court, INS, and Fourth Amendment Law
There are three general types of situations in which Immigration
and Naturalization Services agents conduct searches and seizures:
(1) searches and seizures conducted at United States' borders;16
(2) searches and seizures conducted near the borders;' 7 and (3) searches
and seizures which occur in the interior.' 8 Recent decisions have laid
some guidelines with which the INS must now comply in conducting
upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen,' for there is 'no ready
test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search for seize]
against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured
that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected
to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness
of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances. And in making
that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard:
would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'war-
rant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate?
Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on
nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has consistently
refused to sanction. And simple " 'good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not
enough.' . . . If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth
Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be 'secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects,' only in the discretion of the police."
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968) (citations omitted).
13. 681 F.2d at 644.
14. Id.
15. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
16. Searches at the border have generally been referred to by the courts as "checkpoint"
operations. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Ortiz, 422
U.S. 891 (1975). A checkpoint is described as a stop at a specific location at the border. Blinking
lights and big signs forewarn cars of the upcoming station. All cars are initially stopped for a
minute or two. If an agent so decides, a car may be directed to a secondary stop where further
questions are asked. 428 U.S. at 545-46.
17. Searches near the border often are called "roving patrol" stops. Alneida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
18. Searches which occur in the interior are often referred to as area control operations. Fac-
tory sweeps are a part of INS area control operations. IGLWU v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624, 626 n.2
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searches and seizures at and near United States borders so that an
alien's fourth amendment rights are protected. 19 However, in order to
understand the current state of the law regarding fourth amendment
protection and the statutory authority provided by the Act, a general
understanding of the protections afforded by the fourth amendment is
necessary.
The fourth amendment provides that people have a right to be
secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and seizures.20 In
addition, the fourth amendment requires a warrant before a search
may be conducted. Further, the fourth amendment provides that a
warrant will not be issued unless probable cause2' exists and the person
or thing to be searched or seized is described with particularity.
22
Prior to 1968, the fourth amendment guarantee against unreasona-
ble seizures was analyzed in terms of arrest, probable cause for arrest,
and warrants based on such probable cause.23 The meaning of a
"seizure" under the fourth amendment was analogous to the meaning
of a technical arrest which consisted of the person being booked, photo-
graphed, fingerprinted and held over for an arraignment and prelimi-
nary hearing. 24 Such an arrest or seizure could only be constitutional if
probable cause existed.2: This requirement of probable cause was
deemed absolute.
26
In 1968, in Terry v. Ohio27, the Supreme Court established an im-
portant exception to the above rule. In Terry, a police officer ap-
proached two men and asked their names. When the men "mumbled
something" after being questioned, the officer grabbed Terry and "pat-
ted down" his outer clothing. A gun was found and Terry was subse-
quently arrested and charged with possessing a concealed weapon.
28
(9th Cir. 1982). For a general description of area control operations, see Chapman, supra note 2,
at 134-35.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
20. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
21. "Probable cause exits where: 'the facts and circumstances within their [the officers']
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in them-
selves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being
committed [by the person to be arrested]" Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949),
quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1924).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
23. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979).
24. Id. at 208; See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
25. 442 U.S. at 207. See supra note 21 for a definition of probable cause.
26. 442 U.S. at 208.
27. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
28. Id. at 6-7.
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Terry appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence29 on
grounds that it was illegally seized.
30
The Supreme Court held that the evidence was not illegally seized
and in so doing established two very significant departures from the
traditional fourth amendment analysis. First, the Court defined the pa-
rameters of a seizure under the fourth amendment. Terry established
that a "seizure" does encompass detentions which are less intrusive
than a full blown arrest.31 When an officer, by means of physical force
or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a person
it may be concluded that a seizure has occurred.
32
Secondly, Terry established an exception to the rule that fourth
amendment seizures must be based on probable cause.33 The Terry
Court sets forth a test for reasonableness where no probable cause ex-
ists. If an officer has specific and articulable facts which give rise to a
reasonable inference that criminal activity has been, is, or is about to be
committed and that the person might be armed and dangerous, he may
"seize" the person on that basis without a showing of probable cause.34
One basis for this departure from the probable cause requirement was
the need for police officers to be able to search someone believed to be
dangerous. The Court, nevertheless, reasoned that the Terry stop is an
intrusion and must be tested by the fourth amendment proscription
against unreasonable search and seizure.
35
Several years later, in Dunaway v. New York, 36 the Supreme Court
held that the Terry exception to the probable cause requirement could
not be extended to situations where:
[tihe detention of petitioner was in important respects indistinguish-
able from a traditional arrest. Petitioner was not questioned briefly
where he was found. Instead, he was taken from a neighbor's home
to a police car, transported to a police station, and placed in a inter-
rogation room. He was never informed that he was "free to go";
29. When evidence is obtained in violation of the fourth amendment, it may be suppressed or
inadmissible. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
30. 392 U.S. at 8.
31. 392 U.S. at 18 n.15. The Court stated, "It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment
governs 'seizures' of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecu-
tion for a crime - 'arrests' in traditional terminology." Id. at 16.
32. Id. at 19 n.16.
33. Id. at 20. The Court stated: "[I1n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer
must be able to point to specific and articuable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Id. at 21. (footnote omitted). The Court
further stated that anything less than this specific and articuable belief would invite intrusions
which simply are impermissible under the fourth amendment. Id. at 22.
34. Id. at 30. See supra note 12 for a description of the reasonableness standard.
35. Id.
36. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
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indeed he would have been physically restrained if he had refused to
accompany the officers or had tried to escape their custody.
37
First, the Dunaway Court determined that the defendant had clearly
been seized.38 The State argued that such a seizure should be justified
by mere reasonable suspicion, 39 instead of probable cause. The Duna-
way Court reasoned that Terry was not intended to lower the level of
suspicion from probable cause to a "reasonable suspicion" where the
intrusion is indistinguishable from an arrest.40
One year later, the Supreme Court was again faced with determin-
ing what constitutues a seizure invoking fourth amendment protection.
Justice Stewart, in his plurality opinion in United States v. Menden-
hal 41 , set forth the proposition that where one voluntarily cooperates
with the authorities and feels free to leave, then he has not been seized
for fourth amendment purposes.42 If a seizure has not been found by
the Court, then the fourth amendment analysis ends. If, however, a
seizure has been found, then the second part of the analysis is whether
the seizure was constitutional.
Thus, when faced with a claim of an unreasonable search or
seizure, the two important fourth amendment issues the court must ad-
dress are: (1) whether a seizure has occurred and (2) whether the level
of suspicion required should be probable cause or a lesser Terry type
standard. As will become clearer when examining the border search
cases, fourth amendment law requires a balancing process. The more
intrusive the seizure, (i.e., an arrest as seen in Dunaway), the higher the
37. Id. at 212.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 211-12.
40. Id. at 216. See also United States v. Sanchez-Jaramillo, 637 F.2d 1094, 1098 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 862 (1980), where the court stated that Terry granted police "a narrowly
drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer,
where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual."
41. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
42. Id. at 559-60. (Only Justice Rehnquist expressly joined Justice Stewart in the portion of
the opinion that expressed this view (Part II-A). However, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Powell
did not indicate disagreement with this view.). In Mendenhall, a woman was stopped at the air-
port by Drug Enforcement agents. They identified themselves as agents and asked to see her
identification and to see her plane ticket. The officers did not wear uniforms and did not display
weapons. Id. at 555. They asked her a few other questions and then asked her to accompany
them to the DEA office. The Court, in a plurality decision, found that under the test of whether
one would feel free to leave, no seizure occurred. Id. at 559. See also United States v. Anderson,
663 F.2d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 1981) (where the following five factors were found to indicate that a
person would not feel free to leave: (1) presence of five DEA agents, one police officer and four
deputy sheriffs; (2) physical escort to the terminal from the plane; (3) placement in a small room;
(4) testimony from plaintiff that they were told to leave the plane rather than requested; and
(5) constant presence of the officers, even on trips to the bathroom.). See generally Preiser, Con-
frontations Initiated by the Police On Less Than Probable Cause, 45 ALa. L. REV. 57 (1980).
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level of suspicion required.43 Additionally, the more crucial the gov-
ernmental or policy needs for the enforcement are, (i.e., in Terry the
policeman's safety), the more likely that the Court will lower the level
of suspicion required for making the detention or seizure.44
The Supreme Court on Border Searches
Against this background of fourth amendment law, the Supreme
Court considered in several cases the constitutionality of searches and
seizures at and near the borders within the context of the fourth
amendment. These cases interpret section 1357, which empowers the
INS to question, without a warrant, an alien or anyone believed to be
an alien. The border search cases provide some guidance for the lower
courts in analyzing the INS interior control operation. This is largely
because the border search cases reflect the Court's view of the nature of
the balancing process between the degree of the seizure of the alien, the
level of suspicion required for the seizure, and the governmental need
for controlling illegal immigration.
Stationary Searches and Seizures Conducted Near the Border
In 1976, the Supreme Court in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte
45
held that cars at checkpoint operations may be stopped on less than
reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage. The checkpoint operation con-
sisted of a permanent immigration stop where all cars were inspected
visually and, then, some were waved on and others were waved over to
a second point where brief questions were asked. 46 Large signs fore-
warned drivers that they would be approaching an immigration stop.
The Court stated that although the stops were "seizures" recognized
under the fourth amendment the need for making these stops was
great.47 Further, the Court reasoned that the invasion of privacy
caused by the stops was minimal,48 and relied on its view49 that the
43. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
44. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
45. 428 U.S. 546-7 (1976).
46. Id. at 547.
47. Id. at 556.
48. Id. at 557-58. The Court stated:
Neither the vehicle nor its occupants are searched, and visual inspection of the vehicle is
limited to what can be seen without a search. This objective intrusion - the stop itself,
the questioning, and the visual inspection - also existed in roving-patrol stops. But we
view checkpoint stops in a different light because the subjective intrusion - the generat-
ing of concern or even fright on the part of the lawful travelers - is appreciably less in
the case of a checkpoint stop.
Id. at 558.
49. Id. at 562. The Court noted, "one's expectation of privacy in an automobile and of free-
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expectation of privacy in a car is less than in one's home.50
The Martinez Court allowed the stops on even less suspicion than
that required in Terry. 5' Nevertheless, the Court did find that the short
stop of the car constituted a seizure and, therefore, the Court was re-
quired to determine the constitutionality of the seizure. Clearly, the
reduced constitutional protection at checkpoints was based largely on
the minimal intrusion of such stops.
Roving Searches and Seizures Conducted Near the Border
In 1973, the Court inAlmeida-Sanchez v. United States52 held that
the stopping of a car by border patrols twenty-five miles from the bor-
der required probable cause or a warrant. InAlmeida, the Border Pa-
trol stopped the defendant twenty-five miles north of the United States-
Mexico border. The car was stopped on the basis of the driver's Mexi-
can appearance. After the car was stopped because of the driver's ap-
pearance, his car was thoroughly searched and marijuana was found.
It was undenied "that the Border Patrol had no search warrant, and
that there was no probable cause of any kind for the stop or the subse-
quent search - not even the 'reasonable suspicion' found sufficient for
a street detention and weapons search in Terry v. Ohio .53
The Court determined that border searches could be conducted
without probable cause, but only if the search was at the border or its
"functional equivalent. ' 54 The ,41meida Court recognized the need for
the federal government to have power to control the influx of illegal
aliens into this country.55 Hence, the Court determined that searches
could be made at the border or its functional equivalent on less than
probable cause.
56
dom in its operation are significantly different from the traditional expectation of privacy and
freedom in one's residence." Id. See also Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (expecta-
tion of privacy in a car is lower because a car is in the public's scrutiny). See also South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
50. 428 U.S. at 561.
51. Id. at 562. Thus the Court held that the stops and questioning at checkpoints may be
made in the absence of any individualized suspicion. Id.
52. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
53. Id. at 268.
54. Id. at 272. The Court indicated that a functional equivalent of the border might exist
where the following three factors are present: (1) an established checking station; (2) situated near
the border; (3) at a confluence of roads leading directly from the border. Id. at 273. It should be
noted that section 1357(a)(3) provides that an officer is empowered to board on any vehicle or
conveyance to search for aliens with a reasonable distance from the border of the United States.
Reasonable distance is defined by regulation to be within 100 air miles of the border. 8 C.F.R.
§287. l(a)(2) (1979).
55. 413 U.S. at 272.
56. Id. at 272-73.
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Since in Almeida the stop was made away from the border, the
Court determined that probable cause was required. 57 The Court rea-
soned that the fourth amendment protects all travellers from the indig-
nity and inconvenience of a search on the offchance that an agent will
find an illegal alien.
58
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,59 the Court applied Terry in
the context of roving border patrol stops. The facts in Brignoni showed
that the INS border Patrol Officers observed a car containing three oc-
cupants who appeared to be of Mexican descent. The car was being
driven near the border when the officers stopped the car and ques-
tioned the three people, learning that two of them were illegal aliens.
The Court ruled that officers may stop a vehicle away from the border
if they have a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contains illegal
aliens. The Brignoni Court held, however, that even the Terry standard
of specific and articulable facts, together with reasonable inferences
from those facts, was not present. 60 In this case the officers relied solely
on the Mexican appearance of the people stopped. The Brignoni Court
reasoned that this alone did not satisfy the standard that there be a
reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is an illegal alien.
61
The Brignoni Court weighed the governmental interest in control-
ling the influx of illegal aliens against the intrusion of a roving patrol
stop62 and determined that the governmental interest warranted a re-
duced standard.63 Brignoni, however, reserved the question of whether
a car could be stopped only on the grounds that there was an alien in it,
when the agents had no specific suspicion that any party in the automo-
57. Id. at 273.
58. Id. at 274, (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1924)).
59. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
60. Id. at 886.
61. Id. The Court suggested, however, that such factors as: (1) driver's behavior, i.e., driving
erratically to avoid the officer; (2) aspects of the vehicle itself (compartments visible where an
alien might hide); (3) the vehicle appearing heavily loaded might warrant a reasonable suspicion.
Id. at 885.
62. The degree of intrusion of a roving border patrol stop is best explained in United States
v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975). In Ortiz, the Court stated:
ITihe circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop and search are far less intrusive than
those attending a roving-patrol stop. Roving patrols often operate at night on seldom-
traveled roads, and their approach may frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints the
motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the
officers' authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the
intrusion.
Id. at 894-95.
63. Id. at 881-82. The Court weighed the fact that 85% of the aliens illegally in this country
are from Mexico and there were an estimated several million illegal aliens in this country against
the intrusion of the stop. Id. at 878-79.
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bile was an illegal alien.64
Recently, in United States v. Cortez, 65 the Court held that roving
border stops are permissible only if all the circumstances lead to a rea-
sonable particularized inference that the person stopped is engaged in
wrongdoing. 66 Thus, Cortez appears to answer the question left open
by the Brignoni Court.
Uncertainty Among the Circuits.- Interior Stops and Factory Sweeps
Since the Supreme Court has not ruled on the question of what
level of suspicion is necessary before the INS may conduct a factory
sweep or other interior stop, lower courts have been applying the law
set forth in the border search cases with varying results. While the
Supreme Court has not clearly delineated the standard to be applied
even in the border cases, one recurring principle in those cases and
other fourth amendment cases is that a balance must be reached be-
tween the level of suspicion an officer must have before making the
stop and the degree of intrusion which the stop entails.
67
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has been one of the first jurisdictions to address the issue of the
constitutionality of section 1357 in urban settings.68  The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals ruled in Yam Sang Kwai v. INS 69 that an
immigration officer has statutory authority to question a person whom
he reasonably believes is an alien as to his right to be in the United
64. Id. at 884 n.9. See Note, Reasonable Suspicion of Illegal Alienage As a Precondition to
"Stops" ofSuspectedAliens, 52 CHi-KENT L. REV. 485, 497 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Reasonable
Suspicion], where the author suggests "[wlhile Brignoni-Ponce reserved the question of whether
the suspicion must be of illegal alienage ... the language used in the text continued to phrase
the standard in terms of illegal alienage."
65. 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). In Cortez, INS agents had been observing for some time foot-
prints in the sand of about 8-20 people near the Mexican border. They observed one recurring
footprint which bore a distinctive V-shaped design. The agents surmised that a person was guid-
ing illegal aliens into the country over the path marked to a point where they could be picked up
by a vehicle. From the number of prints the agents determined that a vehicle large enough to
carry 8-20 people would be used. They then staked out the area and stopped a vehicle for ques-
tioning. The petitioners argued that the officers did not have adequate cause to make the investi-
gatory stop. Id. at 415-16. The Supreme Court held on these facts there was sufficient
individualized information to make the stop. Id. at 421-22.
66. Id. at 421-22. Thus some courts interpret Cortez as requiring a belief of illegal alienage
particularized to the person stopped, before any stop may be made. Illinois Migrant Council v.
Pilliod, 531 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ill. 1982), This appears to be a correct reading of Cortez. The
Cortez Court states "Itihis demand for specificity in the information upon which police action is
predicated is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth Amendmentyurisprudence. " 449 U.S. at 418,
quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 n.18 (1968) (emphasis in original).
67. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
68. Cheung Tin Wong v. INS, 468 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Yam Sang Kwai v. INS, 411
F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 396 U.S. 877 (1969).
69. 411 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 877 (1969).
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States as long as no detention occurs.70 In holding that section 1357
gives to immigration officers the right to interrogate people reasonably
believed to be of alien origin, the District of Columbia Circuit reasoned
that the minimal invasion was justified by the special needs of immi-
gration officers to make such inquiries.7' However, the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit qualified this position in Au Yi Lau v. INS, 72 stating
that when there is a forcible detention, the agent must then have reason
to believe that the alien is in this country illegally.
73
In a recent decision, the District of Columbia Circuit determined
that a search warrant to enter commercial premises to search for illegal
aliens need not be specific or individualized as to the persons sought.
74
In Blackie's House of Beef, Inc., v. Castillo,75 a restaurant owner
brought two separate actions against the INS.76 The INS had received
information that Blackie's restaurant employed illegal aliens. The in-
formation provided to the INS included an affidavit from an appre-
hended alien claiming to have worked at Blackie's, an informant who
said Hispanics were employed there and who named two illegal aliens,
and three anonymous phone calls stating that Blackie's was employing
illegal aliens.77 The INS had also apprehended two illegal aliens who
were carrying wage statements from Blackie's. A warrant 78 was issued
under the rules of criminal procedure and the INS entered the restau-
rant and seized fifteen employees, ten of whom were illegal aliens. The
court held that since the INS can stop and question pursuant to their
statutory mandate of section 1357, it was inappropriate to issue a war-
rant under criminal procedure.79 A second warrant was issued 80 and
again deportable aliens were located.
70. Id. at 686.
71. Id. at 687. The dissent argues, however, that the invasion of the stop was neither minimal
nor mere questioning. The dissent states that where guards are posted at the door one is not free
to leave and hence, mere questioning becomes detainment. Id. at 691. See generally, Note, Tem-
porary Detentions of Aliensfor the Purpose of Interrogation Are Subject to the Terry Doctrine, 72
COLUM. L. REV. 593 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Temporary Detention].
72. 445 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971).
73. Id. at 223. The Eighth Circuit also applied the District of Columbia standard. Shu Fuk
Cheung v. INS, 476 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1973).
74. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, 659 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 940 (1982).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1213.
77. Id. at 1213-14.
78. The warrant for the first seizure was conducted pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, not the statutory mandate of section 1357.
79. 659 F.2d at 1228.
80. Id. at 1217-18. The authority for the second warrant was from the INS general statutory
authority to question aliens suspected of entering the country illegally. Id.
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In neither case did the warrants specify the persons to be seized.
The court held that the second warrant under the authority of section
1357 was constitutional even though no specific person was named. 8'
The Blackie's court determined that while the lower standard required
was not comparable to that of administrative warrants, 82 the warrant
did not require the specificity set forth in a criminal situation. 83 The
Blackie's court reasoned that the legislative intent of section 1357 was
to give the INS authority to question aliens without too much restraint
so that enforcement of immigration laws would be effective. 84 The
court, emphasizing the governmental need to enforce immigration
laws, determined that to require greater specificity would render the
INS powerless.
The Seventh Circuit has found that section 1357 should be read as
not allowing any type of stop based solely on alienage. 85  In Illinois
Migrant Council v. Pilliod,86 several individuals and the Illinois Mi-
grant Council brought a class action suit seeking injunctive relief
against the INS. The complaint alleged that the INS conducted a pat-
tern and practice of harassment 87 in violation of the plaintiffs' first,
fourth, and fifth amendment rights. The district court found that the
INS had stopped a car and threatened the occupants with jail if they
did not show a satisfactory alien green card, and that the INS had
stopped individuals solely on the basis of their Mexican appearance
and had asked for identification. The facts also showed that the INS,
without warrants, entered cottages owned by the Del Monte plant at
4:30 a.m. and demanded that the sleeping occupants get up and show
identification. The INS also went into Del Monte plants and ques-
tioned people. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court, ruling
81. Id. at 1227.
82. Id. at 1218. Administrative warrants are generally issued for the purpose of routine in-
spections for building code violations and the like. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307
(1978). The Blackie's court determined that the "neutral standards" (meaning no particularized
suspicion is required) of administrative searches was not apparent here because the warrant was
issued to inspect specific violations. 659 F.2d at 1218. See Note, Search and Seizure, 22 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 670 (1981).
83. Id. at 1218. The Blackie's court reasoned that because the detention and deportation of
illegal aliens is not criminal law enforcement, and no criminal sanctions are imposed by law upon
a knowing employer of illegal aliens, the warrant was issued to aid the INS in its statutory man-
date, not police in criminal law enforcement. Id.
84. The Blackie's court provides a fairly extensive discussion of the legislative intent of sec-
tion 1357, and utilizes the legislative intent to reach its ultimate holding. Id. at 1220 n. 10.
85. Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1065. Included in the charges of harrassment were illegal searches, seizures, ar-
rests, interrogatories, detentions and mass raids. Id.
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that section 1357 does not permit these type of stops and searches. 88
Further, the court held that the statute must be construed in a manner
consistent with the fourth amendment.
89
An injunction was granted and the INS was prohibited from "ar-
resting, detaining, stopping and interrogating. . . unless they possess
a valid warrant, have probable cause to search without a warrant, or
have a reasonable suspicion based on specific articulable facts that such
person is an alien unlawfully in the United States." 90 The Seventh Cir-
cuit suggested that this injunction would not prevent casual conversa-
tion between an INS agent and an alien as long as the alien is not
detained.9 1 Further, the injunction prohibited the INS from entering
dwellings, houses or dormitories without a warrant. 9
2
Subsequent to the Seventh Circuit case, the INS moved to modify
the preliminary injunction arguing that it should be allowed to use ad-
ministrative warrants under the Blackie's standard, which requires only
specific evidence of a violation of the immigration laws on the premises
to be searched. 93 They would not then be required to show evidence as
to the specific persons being sought. The court held that the INS may
not conduct investigatory stops based solely on the suspicion that the
person stopped is an alien.94 The district court ruled that the INS may
stop and detain an alien only where there is a reasonable suspicion that
he is unlawfully in this country.95 Citing Terry v. Ohio96 and United
States v. Cortez,97 the court held that there must be some specific objec-
tive manifestation that the person stopped is or is about to be engaged
in criminal activity.98 The court reasoned that to allow investigatory
stops of aliens on lesser grounds would subvert the fundamental princi-
pal of fourth amendment jurisprudence. 99 The court further held that
88. Id. at 1066.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1067. The injunction was modified slightly. The modification allowed for stopping
and questioning by agents as long as no detention occurred. Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod,
548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977).
91. 540 F.2d at 1070 n.10.
92. Id. at 1072.
93. Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 531 F. Supp. 1011, 1020 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
94. Id. at 1019.
95. Relying heavily on the wording by the Court in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873 (1975), the court reasoned that investigatory stops were only allowed where there was a
reasonable suspicion that the persons are aliens illegally in this country. Id. at 1017-18 (emphasis
added). See supra note 62.
96. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
97. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
98. 531 F. Supp. at 1017.
99. Id. Deciding that such a standard is necessary the court said:
If the INS had this [unchecked] power, it would be able to arbitrarily 'seize' a large
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it would not allow the INS to obtain warrants to search dwellings
"under the relaxed probable cause standard of Blackie's House of
Beef."'0o
The Third Circuit has adopted a different approach than the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit. In Lee v. INS,10 ' the Third Circuit held that
the standard to be applied is whether the stop and interrogation are
reasonably related in scope to the justification of their initiation.'
0 2
Rather than adopting the District of Columbia Circuit approach of de-
termining whether the encounter was "mere questioning" or a "forcible
detention," the focus for the Third Circuit is whether the circumstances
the agent described passed the threshold of reasonable suspicion. 03 In
Lee, there were several factors leading up to the suspicion. An INS
officer, on an unrelated assignment, saw two men walking across a
parking lot. A restaurant was located there, which the officer knew
from prior experience, had employed illegal aliens. The two men at-
tracted attention because they were speaking Chinese and wore white
shirts typical of kitchen help. The Third Circuit determined that the
factors described by the agent gave rise to individualized suspicion that
Lee was in the country illegally. 104
However, the Third Circuit in a later decision, Babula v. INS,'0 5
category of persons, many if not most of whom are presumably engaged in no wrongdo-
ing. That is the sort of general seizure, not linked to specific facts which give rise to an
inference that the specific individual seized is engaged in criminal activity, which the
fourth amendment prohibits.
Id. This point is further demonstrated in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979). In that case,
officers detained and searched all the patrons of the bar. In holding the search of Ybarra uncon-
stitutional, the Court noted, ". . . a search or seizure of the person must be supported by prob-
able cause particularized with respect to a person. This requirement cannot be undercut or
avoided by simply pointing to the fact that coincidentally there exists probable cause to search
another .... " Id. at 9 1.
100. 531 F. Supp. at 1023. While Blackie's dealt with warrants for commercial premises and
Pilliod dealt with warrants to search dwellings, the Pilliod court suggests that even if given a
warrant to search the premises, the warrant does not then permit a seizure of persons on the
premises. Id. at 1020. There is some uncertainty, however, as to whether Piliod extends to fac-
tory situations equally. While Pilliod's facts involved factory surveys, the emphasis of the court
was on the search of the dwellings. But the initial injunction in Pilliod was directed at factory
control operations as well as searches of dwellings, dormitories, and street encounters. Id. at 1020.
101. 590 F.2d 497 (3d Cir. 1979).
102. Id. at 502.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 665 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1981). In Babula, the INS conducted a factory survey looking for
illegal Polish aliens. The INS had received a tip that seven named illegal aliens were employed at
a factory. INS records, however, indicated that six of the seven were not subject to deportation.
Id. at 295. Upon entry the INS learned that the seventh person no longer worked there. The INS
questioned workers even though they no longer had any suspicion about any specific individual.
Ten workers were arrested. Id. at 295.
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held that an individualized suspicion was not necessary. '0 6 The facts in
Babula showed that the agents had reason to believe that only some of
the workers were illegal aliens. 0 7 Moreover, the one specific individ-
ual they did suspect no longer worked there. 08 The INS checked out
the H & H factory and determined that it was a feasible location for an
area control operation. They then had six agents go to the factory to
look for aliens in violation of their immigration status. Three agents
were posted at the exits of the factory "to prevent anyone from leav-
ing"'1 9 and three entered the factory. Upon entry, the agents spoke
with the general manager and asked about the seventh person on the
list believed to still be working there. After learning that he no longer
worked there, the agents with no information as to any other named
individuals, began questioning the workers about their citizenship sta-
tus and whether they had the proper papers. The Third Circuit deter-
mined that where agents believed some people were illegal aliens
working in a factory, the "milieu" " 0 suspicion was constitutionally suf-
ficient to allow INS to stop and question all workers." '
Thus, jurisdictions which have addressed the questioning of per-
sons by an immigration officer have reached varied results. The Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit approaches the issue by first examining
whether the stop is detentive. If it is, then the court determines whether
there is a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the questioned person is
an alien illegally in the country."l 2 However, after the Blackie's deci-
sion it appears the District of Columbia Circuit might require less than
individualized suspicion." 3 The Seventh Circuit appears to handle the
problem similarly to the District of Columbia Circuit, at least with re-
106. Id. at 296.
107. Id,
108. Id. In effect, when the INS went into the factory they had no specific suspicion that
anyone was an illegal alien.
109. Id. at 294.
110. The milieu concept is essentially that suspicion about the milieu in which the workers are
found is enough suspicion to warrant questioning of the group. Id.
11l. Id. at 296-97. However, the Third Circuit noted that "although questioning without indi-
vidualized suspicion raises serious constitutional concerns, we think that the facts of this case
present one of these instances where such questioning is permissible." Id. at 297.
112. Au Yi Lau v. INS, 445 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
113. See 659 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The Blackie's court dealt with the issue of warrants
to search premises for illegal aliens and held that specificity in search warrants was not necessary.
Id. at 1225. Rather the court held only some 'quantum of individualized suspicion' as to the
persons sought is required. Id. Therefore, there is a question as to whether the District of Colum-
bia Circuit would extend their reasoning to detentive stops of illegal aliens, thus requiring only
some quantum of suspicion, not an articuable and specified suspicion. The Third Circuit, how-
ever, allowed stops to be made with only some quantum of suspicion. Babula v. INS, 665 F.2d
293, 296-97 (3d Cir. 1981).
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spect to its approach to detentive versus non-detentive questioning. By
contrast, the Third Circuit appears to afford less weight to the nature of
the stop and does not require an individualized suspicion that the per-
son detained is an illegal alien. 1 4 The Ninth Circuit in International
Ladies' Garment Worker's Union v. Sureck" 5 determined that deten-
tive questioning requires an individualized suspicion as to each person
detained. " 
6
INTERNATIONAL LADIES' GARMENT WORKERS' UNION, AFL-CIO v.
SURECK
Facts of the Case
This suit was brought by several employees" 7 and the Interna-
tional Ladies' Garment Workers' Union" 18 against the INS challenging
the constitutionality of three separate factory sweeps. 19 The factory
sweeps challenged by the Union and the employees were conducted for
the purpose of locating illegal aliens. 120 The appellants sought injunc-
tive relief from the INS's practice of conducting factory sweeps.' 2'
Three particular factory sweeps were challenged, two at the same
factory and one at another. The agents had obtained search war-
rants 122 to enter the factory for the first two sweeps and the owner's
consent for the third. 123 The search warrants did not state any particu-
114. Id. at 297.
115. 681 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1982).
116. Id. at 643.
117. Two of the appellants were United States citizens and two were resident aliens. 681 F.2d
at 627.
118. The International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union alleged it represented thousands of
garment workers, the majority of whom are of Latin ancestry. Id. at 627-28.
119. Sureck sets forth a description of a typical factory sweep: The typical factory sweep
begins when the INS receives information that a particular work place may be employing illegal
aliens. In order to verify the information, the INS places the suspected location under visual
surveillance to determine whether it appears the factory employs illegal aliens. If their informa-
tion is verified, the agents are then instructed to request permission of the work place owner or
manager for INS to enter and question the employees. The ultimate goal is to arrest those found
to be in the country illegally. If consent is not given then a warrant is obtained.
The INS then enters the factories and stations agents at all exits and entrances. The remain-
ing agents proceed through the factory questioning workers as to their citizenship status. While
the agents are told to be courteous and cause as little disruption as possible, the sweeps often begin
with cries of "LaMigra" (the immigration) and people running to hide. The agents are instructed
to question all workers although the INS admits that such a task is often not possible. Id. at 626.
120. Id. at 627.
121. Id. at 626.
122. The INS admitted during oral argument that the warrant only justified the initial entry
into the work place. The detentive questioning was therefore considered warrantless. Id. at 629
n.8.
123. Id. at 627.
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lar names. 24 After entry the INS placed agents at all the exits,' 25 and
at two of the factories agents questioned only some of the workers.
126
The United States District Court for the Central District of Cali-
fornia granted summary judgment in favor of the INS.127 First, the dis-
trict court found that INS's warrants were valid because they contained
sufficient particularity as to the person to be seized and they were based
upon sufficient probable cause. 128 In the alternative, the district court
found that the appellants lacked a sufficient privacy interest in their
workplace to contest the surveys pursuant to warrant or consent. 129 On
the issue of whether the INS detention and questioning of workers dur-
ing the survey was appropriate, the district court found for the INS. 30
The court held that the workers were not arrested, detained or seized in
a manner invoking the fourth amendment and that the INS properly
conducted the questioning pursuant to section 1357(a)(1). '3' Finally,
the court found that even if a seizure did occur by placement of agents
at factory exits, the degree of intrusion was so minimal that no fourth
amendment violation occurred.
32
The Ninth Circuit Opinion
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the summary judgment findings of the
district court de novo. 133 The issues before the Ninth Circuit were:
(1) whether factory surveys constitute a seizure cognizable under the
fourth amendment; (2) what standards must be met for the seizure to be
constitutional under the fourth amendment; and (3) whether the INS
124. Id. at n.5.
125. Id. at 626-27.
126. Not all the workers were questioned because of a shortage of INS manpower. Id. at 627.
The factors which an agent used to determine which workers would be questioned included: a
person's clothing, facial appearance, hair coloring and styling, demeanor (i.e., anxiety or fright),
language and accent. Id. at 627 n.6.
127. Id. at 628.
128. Id.
129. The Ninth Circuit stated that the district court's finding that the plaintiffs did not have a
legitimate privacy interest in the factory premises was significant, but they never actually ad-




133. In reviewing the case de novo, the court explained that the parties agreed that none of the
material facts were in dispute. The court further explained the test to be applied in reviewing the
grant or denial of a summary judgment motion. The test which the Ninth Circuit applied was that
summary judgment would be proper only if there was no genuine issue of any material fact or
when viewing the evidence and the inferences which may be drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the adverse party, the movant is clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Id. at
629.
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met the standards during the factory sweeps that were the subject of the
litigation.
The Factory Sweep Constituted a Seizure
The INS contended that the facts did not present a detention or
seizure which would invoke the objective standard required by the
fourth amendment.' 34 The INS argued that the test should be whether
a person would feel free to leave. 35 In rejecting the INS argument, the
court held that a custodial detention as seen in Dunaway v. New
York 136 did not exist because none of the workers were physically re-
strained, hand-cuffed, or placed into custody until the agents had suffi-
cient probable cause to suspect that the employee was illegally in the
country. t 37 However, the procedures used by the INS to carry out the
operation, such as the number of agents employed and the execution of
the sweep itselp 38 led the Ninth Circuit to find that a seizure of the
work force occurred thus invoking fourth amendment protection.
139
Constitutional Standard For a Factory Sweep
The Ninth Circuit then addressed the constitutional standard ap-
plicable to the INS conduct. The court held that an individualized sus-
picion of illegal alienage is required for sufficient protection of fourth
amendment rights. 14 The Ninth Circuit using the language of two
very recent Supreme Court cases, United States v. Cortezl4' and Michi-
gan v. Summers, 42 determined that the Court had intended that
134. Id.
135. Id. The INS further contended that the four named plaintiffs circulated throughout the
factory and could not have reasonably felt detained by the INS. Id. at 630. The INS also dis-
counted the placing of agents at the doors by arguing that the only encounter the plaintiffs had
with an agent was when an agent asked them one to three questions. Id.
136. 442 U.S. 200, 211 (1979) (where the petitioner was actually escorted to the police station
and placed in an interrogation room).
137. 681 F.2d at 630.
138. The court found that the following factors indicated a seizure occurred: (1) the agents
were stationed at all the exits; (2) the investigators' authority was announced verbally and the
badges of the INS were displayed; (3) some agents carried handcuffs and used them to detain
those suspected of being in this country illegally; (4) the element of surprise with which the opera-
tion unfolded and the disruption of the work environment, and the methodical execution of the
operation with a line of agents proceeding down each row of workers which could easily appear
threatening. Id. at 634.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 643.
141. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
142. 452 U.S. 692 (1981). In Summers, the Court upheld as constitutional the seizure of a
person who was leaving his home as police officers arrived to execute a search warrant to check
the premises for drugs. Id. at 705. Summers set forth three criteria for reasonableness of a nonar-
rest seizure: (i) the intrusion must be limited in time and extent; (2) it must be justified by law
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seizures must be based on some reasonable suspicion of illegal or crimi-
nal activity. 43 In deciding that the fourth amendment constitutionally
requires a reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage, the court recognized
that its decision limited the statutory authority of section 1357(a)(1).144
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that to hold otherwise would weaken the
fourth amendment's protection of both citizens and aliens in this coun-
try. 14 5 Further, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that to allow INS to ran-
domly question people without specific facts giving rise to an
individualized suspicion of illegal alienage would grant the INS imper-
missible discretion to detain persons and question them at whim. 46
The court further refused to adopt the Third Circuit's holding that
a "milieu" standard is acceptable for constitutional purposes. 147 The
INS, citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,48 contended that the gov-
ernmental interest in enforcement of the immigration laws permits it to
question workers on a less than individualized suspicion. 149 The Ninth
Circuit rejected the INS argument. The court reasoned that where a
detention is as frightening and intrusive as a factory sweep, a reason-
able individualized suspicion that each worker is an illegal alien is
required. 
50
Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that the INS had not met the require-
ments of the standard of individualized suspicion nor a reasonable sus-
picion of illegal alienage in carrying out the factory sweeps. The INS
had set forth the following facts to articulate their suspicion: (1) the
factories were garment factories known to employ large numbers of
enforcement concerns; (3) it must be related to the person seized by articuable facts which create a
sufficient basis for believing the person is involved in criminal behavior. Id. at 702-03. The Ninth
Circuit relied heavily on the third criterion. 681 F.2d at 635. For a discussion of the implications
of the Summers decision, see Note, Gauging the Reasonableness of Nonarrest Seizures: The Emerg-
ing Rule of Michigan v. Summers, 46 ALB. L. REV. 631 (1981).
143. 681 F.2d at 635.
144. Id. at 639. In limiting section 1357(a)(1), the Ninth Circuit notes the Supreme Court's
admonition that "... no Act of Congress can authorize a violation of the Constitution." United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 877 (1975). Id., quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973).
145. Id. The Supreme Court stated in Brignoni that section 1357 authorizes Congress to admit
aliens on the condition that they will submit to reasonable questioning about their right to be and
remain in this country but this power cannot diminish the fourth amendment rights of citizens
who may be mistaken for aliens. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975).
146. Id. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (where random stopping of cars for
license checks was held violative of the fourth amendment).
147. 681 F.2d at 641-43. Contra Babula v. INS, 665 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1981).
148. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
149. 681 F.2d at 641. In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court lowered the level of suspicion required
because the governmental need for enforcing immigration laws was great when compared to the
minimal intrusion of a checkpoint operation. 428 U.S. at 557 (1976).
150. 681 F.2d at 640-41.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
illegal aliens; (2) the INS had arrested other illegal aliens outside the
premises who said others were employed there; (3) upon entry the peo-
ple shouted "LaMigra" (immigration agents) and began running and
hiding; and (4) the INS knew that 78 illegal aliens had been previously
apprehended there. 15 Recognizing that this decision may hinder INS
efforts to seek out illegal aliens in work forces, the court nevertheless
maintained that the factors set forth by the INS leading to the sweeps
were not constitutionally sufficient to warrant the seizure. 152
ANALYSIS
The Seizure
The Ninth Circuit first determined that the factory sweep consti-
tuted a seizure for fourth amendment purposes. The court applied the
test for a seizure set forth in United States v. Mendenhall,5 3 Terry v.
Ohio, 54 and by the Ninth Circuit itself in United States v. Anderson, 155
and properly found that a seizure had occurred. Terry and Mendenhall
stand for the proposition that if a person reasonably feels restrained in
his liberty by a show of force or authority, a seizure has occurred.' 56
By stationing agents at each door of the factory and by displaying im-
migration badges, the INS clearly made a show of force and authority
constituting a seizure for fourth amendment purposes. Undoubtedly, a
person who knew or suspected that there were guards at all doors
would not feel free to leave. The Ninth Circuit does suggest that casual
personal intercourse might be possible between a person and INS in-
vestigators; 57 however, the questioning during the factory sweep was
not of this nature.
58
The standard in Sureck for what constitutes a seizure differs from
the District of Columbia standard. The District of Columbia Circuit
has taken the position that "mere questioning" by an officer based only
on a belief that the person is an alien, is not a seizure and is constitu-
tionally permissible. 59 If, however, the agent "forcibly" detains the
151. Id. at 643.
152. Id. at 644. The court thus reversed the summary judgment granted in favor of the INS
and remanded the case to the district court for further proceeding not inconsistent with the deci-
sion. Id. at 645.
153. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
154. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
155. 663 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1981).
156. 392 U.S. 1 (1969); 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
157. 681 F.2d at 630 n.9.
158. Id.
159. Au Yi Lau v. INS, 445 F.2d 217, 224 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971).
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person, he must believe that the person is an illegal alien. Moreover, if
a person is "merely questioned" and attempts to flee, a forcible deten-
tion arises.160 The distinction between "mere questioning" and "forci-
bly detaining" is not a clear one.161 As a New York district court, in
Marquez v. Kiley, 62 pointed out, a rule which says that a casual en-
counter can occur between the INS, armed with a badge and a gun to
enforce immigration laws, and an alien, without the alien feeling de-
tained is unrealistic. 63 The Ninth Circuit correctly recognized that
where there are INS agents questioning workers in a factory, a seizure
has occurred.
In Sureck, the INS strenuously argued that no seizure or forcible
detention occurred. However, even if no agents were stationed at the
doors, as the Marquez court points out, it is difficult to imagine that the
workers would feel free to leave. Moreover, if they did decide to leave
or refuse to answer, they would then, at least under the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit's formulation, have provided a reason to forcibly detain
them.164 Thus the concept of voluntarily submitting to questioning is
rendered meaningless because as soon as the person walks away the
INS has grounds to forcibly detain him.1 65 The Ninth Circuit sug-
gested that the whole purpose of putting guards at the door was to se-
cure the workforce and if a person fled, he would then be detained.
166
The Sureck court further noted that if the INS did not surround the
factory in order to apprehend those attempting to flee, "the total
160. Id.
161. See Reasonable Suspicion, supra note 64, at 495.
162. 436 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
163. Id. at 114. The Marquez court states:
[W]hatever theoretical appeal there may be to a rule which permits casual, voluntary
questions upon suspicion of alienage alone, but requires suspicion of illegality for deten-
tion, is in our view substantially undermined by the realities of the matter. It is in the
nature of an oxymoron to speak of 'casual' inquiry between a government official armed
with a badge and a gun and charged with enforcing the nation's immigration laws, and a
person suspected of alienage. This is particularly so in the context of area control opera-
tions as described at trial. In such situations a suspect alien is suddenly confronted by
INS officers who have just driven up in an automobile, left the car and directly ap-
proached, and immediately queried as to his nationality. For a constitutional rule in
these matters to depend on the 'voluntary cooperation' of the suspect is to impose a gloss
upon real life. When it is further considered that refusal to cooperate or an attempt to
evade such a 'casual encounter,' indeed, even the appearance of nervousness, may well
be held to provide reasonable grounds to suspect unlawful presence and therefore to
authorize forcible detention. ...
1d. at 113-14. See also Yam Sang Kwai v. INS, 411 F.2d 683, 691 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 877 (1969) (Wright, J., dissenting) (dissent maintains that there are no distinguishable factors
between mere questioning and forcible detention).
164. Au Yi Lau v. INS, 445 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971).
165. See Temporary Detention, supra note 71, at 597.
166. 681 F.2d at 632.
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number of apprehensions would doubtless be reduced."' 167 The deter-
mination that a seizure had occurred was, therefore, a proper one.
Reasonableness of the Seizure
Having determined that a seizure occurred, it became necessary to
determine whether the seizure was reasonable under the fourth amend-
ment. The Ninth Circuit, in determining that the seizure was unrea-
sonable, held that the INS must have an individualized suspicion that
the person seized is an illegal alien. 68 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit
decision would appear to prohibit a factory sweep where the only sus-
picion an agent has is that there are a few illegal aliens working in the
factory.
The Ninth Circuit, in its holding that the sweep was unreasonable
under the fourth amendment, emphasizes two points. First, the court
specifically states that its decision is not limited to a discussion of the
rights of aliens. 169 It reasons that innocent citizens and legal resident
aliens employed at factories deserve the same rights to be free of the
indignity of arbitrary government intrusions which the fourth amend-
ment guarantees all individuals. 170 To protect those rights it is abso-
lutely necessary that the INS have an individualized suspicion as to
each person detained. The second point emphasized by the court is
that without the requirement of an individualized suspicion, detentive
questioning of aliens would be impermissibly random. The court aptly
states that the intrusive and frightening nature of these searches based
on nothing more than inarticulate hunches cannot be constitutional
under the fourth amendment.' 7'
The intrusiveness of the factory sweep can certainly be discerned
from the facts described in Sureck. Where agents in uniform unexpect-
edly went into a workplace and placed guards at all the exits, workers
would naturally become distracted and frightened. Certainly, the im-
age of an officer with hand-cuffs proceeding down a row of workers,
with some expressing their fears by screaming "LaMigra," is a frighten-
ing one, even to the innocent worker. The Ninth Circuit correctly
peceived that a factory sweep is highly intrusive and therefore rejects
the notion that United States v. Martinez-Fuerte 72 allows factory
167. Id.
168. Id. at 643.
169. Id. at 639.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 644.
172. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
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sweeps on less than individualized suspicion. 173
The Sureck court standard of individualized suspicion stands in
direct conflict with the Third Circuit standard in Babula v. INS. 74 The
Third Circuit maintains that a factory sweep can be reasonable merely
based on a "milieu" suspicion that some illegal aliens are employed at
the factory. 75 The Third Circuit never actually discusses the degree of
detention that the workers suffered while being questioned during the
sweep. Because the Third Circuit relies heavily on the reasoning of
Martinez-Fuerte, the necessary implication is that the court viewed the
factory sweep as very unintrusive. Indeed, the Babula court says that
the questioning done by the officers was no more intrusive than the
questioning of persons in a car.' 76 The primary distinction that appears
between the Sureck sweep and the Babula sweep, is that in the former
not all workers were questioned, while in the latter they were. While
arguably there is less arbitrariness in a sweep where all workers are
questioned, the degree of intrusiveness and fright is no different. A
worker during a factory survey has no way of knowing that all or a few
workers will be questioned. Thus the Ninth Circuit, as opposed to the
Third Circuit, recognizes that because of the intrusive nature of a fac-
tory sweep, individualized suspicion is constitutionally required.
The Seventh Circuit decision in Illinois Migrant Council v. Pil-
lodt77 also recognized that where a detention occurs such as in a fac-
tory sweep, a specified and individualized suspicion is required. The
Third Circuit, while claiming to be in agreement with the Seventh Cir-
cuit, clearly represents a significant departure from both the Ninth and
the Seventh Circuits. The Third Circuit reasoned that Pilliod involved
late night searches of dwellings, while the Third Circuit decision dealt
with the issue of searches of factories and thus the decisions were rec-
oncilable. First, the Seventh Circuit opinion did address the issue of
stopping aliens on less than individualized suspicion in situations other
than searches of dwellings and held these to be unconstitutional. 178
The Seventh Circuit held that any situation, where there is a detention
requires more than a vague suspicion of illegal alienage.' 79 Second,
173. 681 F.2d at 640-41.
174. 665 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1981).
175. Id. at 296. It is worth noting who the injured parties are in Babula and Sureck. In
Babula, the plaintiffs were all illegal aliens. In Sureck, the injured parties were two United States
citizens and two legal resident aliens. One might wonder whether this factor had any bearing on
the respective results.
176. Id. at 296.
177. 540 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976).
178. Id. at 1070-71 n.10.
179. Id.
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even if the Seventh Circuit decision did not deal with searches other
than dwellings, it might be argued that the search of one's workplace,
where one spends a majority of his day and has a routinized workday,
is not a place where a person might expect such a type of disruption.
Hence, the Third Circuit's reasoning that when the INS deals with any
situation except one involving the sanctity of private dwellings, individ-
ualized suspicion is not required, 180 suggests that it has not examined
the nature of a search such as a factory sweep. Unlike the Ninth Cir-
cuit, the Third Circuit has not considered what the nature of a person's
fright, anxiety, and concern might be when agents come in and inter-
rupt and disturb the flow of the workplace.
The Sureck stance better protects the concerns voiced in the fourth
amendment. Fourth amendment law entails a balancing of the degree
of the intrusion with the suspicion required.' 8 ' For an arrest, with its
accompanying high degree of intrusion, probable cause is required.
182
A roving border stop requires a reasonable particularized suspicion
that the person is an illegal alien, which is a lower standard than prob-
able cause. 183 For a checkpoint operation, which is regarded as less in-
trusive than either an arrest or roving border stop, the Supreme Court
has held that even less than reasonable suspicion is constitutionally suf-
ficient.184 It would seem apparent that a factory sweep must fall closest
to the roving border patrol in intrusiveness. The Ninth Circuit cor-
rectly recognizes this similarity. A roving border patrol was found in-
trusive because they operate at night and are unexpected stops which
might frighten motorists. 85 Similarly, factory sweeps are unexpected
and unfold with chaos and disruption of the workplace. 186 In addition,
because factory sweeps are on the interior and not near the border,
added elements of surprise are present.
In contrast, the Third Circuit appears to have glossed over the de-
gree of intrusiveness involved in a factory sweep. Analogizing the fac-
tory sweep to the check point operation found minimally intrusive in
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte ,187 the Third Circuit determined that
less than reasonable individualized suspicion is required, hence adopt-
180. Babula v. INS, 655 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1981).
181. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
182. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
183. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
184. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
185. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
186. IGLWU v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624, 634 (9th Cir. 1982).
187. 428 U.S. 543, 546 (1976).
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ing the milieu standard. 8 8 In its attempt to set forth a gauge of what is
or is not intrusive, the Martinez Court spoke of the elements of fright,
unexpectedness, and routinized nature of the operation as determinants
for the level of intrusiveness. 8 9 The higher the degree of intrusion, the
higher the standard of reasonable suspicion required. Clearly the
Ninth Circuit better recognized the Martinez distinctions of intrusive-
ness. The Sureck court correctly states that the factors of no surprise,
short duration and minimal disruption present in a checkpoint opera-
tion do not exist in a factory sweep.' 90
The question presented in both Sureck and Babula rests on
whether the suspicion that there are a few illegal aliens in a factory is
enough to detain and question the whole group. The notion that the
suspicion must be individualized is clearly demonstrated in Ybarra v.
Illinois. 9 1 In Ybarra, police arrived at a bar with a warrant to search
for one person suspected of dealing drugs. The officers detained and
searched all the patrons of the bar including Ybarra. The Court held
that the search of Ybarra was unconstitutional. 92 Ybarra, while not
factually similar, sets forth a principle that the fourth amendment pro-
tects against guilt by association. 93 A close reading of Ybarra suggests
that a suspicion that a few illegal aliens might be present is not consti-
tutionally sufficient to detain the group. The Third Circuit appeared to
ignore the principle set forth in Ybarra, since the practical effect of
Babula is guilt by association in a factory sweep operation.
The approach taken by the Ninth Circuit is more in keeping with
the balancing approach laid out by the Supreme Court. Fourth
amendment law, as applied by the Supreme Court, suggests that a
highly intrusive seizure requires a higher, more specified degree of sus-
picion. Therefore the Ninth Circuit's approach, in contrast to the
Third Circuit's, is consistent with fourth amendment law.
Implications of the Sureck Opinion
Fourth amendment law required the result reached by the Ninth
Circuit, however, the decision creates enormous difficulties for INS law
188. Babula v.INS, 665 F.2d 293, 296-97 (3d Cir. 1981).
189. 428 U.S. at 557-59.
190. 681 F.2d at 640-41.
191. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
192. Id. at 88-96.
193. Id. at 91. Seealso United States v. Heredia-Castillo, 616 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1980)
(where the legitimate stop of one individual did not give rise to an individualized suspicion as to
his passenger).
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enforcement. 94  Sureck raises two important questions, namely:
(1) whether a factory sweep can ever be done in a non-detentive fash-
ion; and, (2) whether the requirement of an individualized suspicion
means that the INS can never carry out a factory sweep unless it be-
lieves that every person working in the factory is an illegal alien.
The first of these questions was specifically left unanswered by the
Ninth Circuit. The court stated, "Assuming a factory survey could be,
or would be performed in a non-detentive atmosphere, it is not appro-
priate in this case for us to provide the INS with a list of justifying
factors for such a hypothetical survey."' 195 The court seems to imply
that a factory survey could never be accomplished in a non-detentive
fashion.
It is difficult to imagine a set of factors short of a list of names and
an informant's tip of illegal alienage that would satisfy the Ninth Cir-
cuit's standard for a constitutional factory sweep. The District of Co-
lumbia Circuit in Blackie's House of Beef v. Castillo196 points out the
irony of a ruling like that of the Ninth Circuit. First, the Blackie's
court suggests that, even if the agent had the first names of suspected
aliens, 197 he would still have to question those appearing to be aliens in
order to find the named individuals. In doing so, the agent will create
the same intrusive atmosphere that the Ninth Circuit found constitu-
tionally inferior. Second, the Blackie's court suggests such a require-
ment would have the effect of leaving the INS free to combat only
isolated instances of illegal immigration but powerless to combat the
much more serious problem of congregations of illegal aliens at one
central place.' 98 As a matter of policy the Blackie's court's reasoning
makes good sense; however, as a matter of constitutional protection it is
clear that the fourth amendment cannot be compromised.
Certainly, in most fourth amendment cases there is a balancing by
the court of fourth amendment protections and law enforcement
needs.199 A proper consideration of the Sureck court was the concern
that innocent and unsuspecting aliens were being subject to such INS
194. The Ninth Circuit recognized that it might create problems by stating, "We recognize
that our decision today may hinder INS efforts to seek out illegal aliens in workplaces." 681 F.2d
at 644.
195. Id. at 643 n.23.
196. 659 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 940 (1982).
197. The Blackie's court points out that illegal aliens are fugitives from the law and hence,
getting vital statistics on them from files in the United States is impossible. 659 F.2d at 1225. In
addition, the court states that the likelihood that an illegal alien would ever use his real name is
slim. Id.
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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operations. The fourth amendment specifications, as suggested earlier,
are intended to protect people from such unwarranted intrusions.
Therefore, it would seem a balance between enforcement needs and
fourth amendment protections require that protection of fourth amend-
ment rights be weighed heavily as the Ninth Circuit correctly did.
To address the dilemma raised by the Blackie's court, bills which
seek to prohibit an employer from knowingly hiring an illegal alien
have been introduced in Congress since 1951.200 One such bill, the Im-
migration Reform and Control Act of 1982, passed the Senate in the
summer of 1982.201 The bill set forth fairly tough criminal sanctions
against employers who knowingly employ illegal aliens.20 2 However,
the lame-duck session of the 97th Congress came to a close and the bill
died.2
03
Since bills have been introduced repeatedly in Congress suggesting
that the answer to the dilemma lies in punishing employers who know-
ingly hire illegal aliens,20 4 it can be assumed that future bills will be
introduced. The question therefore arises as to whether such legislation
actually will lessen or end the illegal alien problem in this country.
It is known that Mexican aliens continue to come to this country
illegally for social and economic reasons.20 5 Mexico's high unemploy-
200. Salinas and Torres, The Undocumented Mexican Alien: A Legal, Social and Economic
Analysis, 13 Hous. L. REV. 863, 900 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Undocumented Mexican Alien].
201. S. 2222, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. §§10619-10631 (1982).
202. The legislation would have prohibited the knowing hiring or employment of illegal aliens
and provide stiff penalties for violating this prohibition. The bills provide that an employer who
violates the Act by hiring undocumented aliens may ultimately be imprisoned. First time viola-
tors, however, are only subject to a fine of $1,000 for each undocumented alien. Each subsequent
violation subjects the employer to a $2,000 fine for each undocumented alien. If a pattern or
practice of violations is found, the employer may be fined $1,000, imprisoned for six months, or
both, for each violation. In addition, the Attorney General may obtain an injunction or re-
straining order to halt repeated violations. Before any penalties are imposed, however, the em-
ployer is entitled to notice and a hearing.
Secondly, the Act passed by the Senate requires that employers of four or more persons attest
on a form supplied by the Attorney General that they have verified the eligibility of an employee
for employment by examining the employee's: (1) U.S. passport; or (2) social security number or
U.S. birth certificate and either an alien identification card, a driver's license, or any other similar
form of identification which the Attorney General considers reliable. The employer does not have
to ascertain that documents presented by an employee are genuine and may rely on documents
that reasonably appear to be genuine. Falsification or fraudulent use of documents required by
the Act subjects the violator to a possible $5,000 fine. If the employer complies in good faith with
these verification requirements, it will have established an affirmative defense to a charge of
knowingly employing undocumented aliens. S. 2222, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. §§10619-10631 (1982).
203. See generally H.R. 6514, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
204. See Comment, Illegal Immigration: Short-Range Solution of Employer Sanctions, 49
Miss. L.J. 659, 681 (1978). [hereinafter cited as Employer Sanctions]. See also Undocumented
Mexican Alien, supra note 200, at 866.
205. See Employer Sanctions, supra note 204, at 663.
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ment 2° 6 and poor economic condition make coming to the United
States a better alternative to the alien than remaining in Mexico, even
if it means doing so illegally.20 7 Employers have been very willing to
hire illegal aliens because they work longer hours and receive lower
wages than the resident workers.208
Perhaps if legislation were passed which did penalize employers,
they would be more reluctant to hire illegal aliens and reduce some of
the incentive for the illegal alien entering this country. However, critics
of the legislation suggest that the bill will have a discriminatory impact,
particularly on people of Hispanic appearance. 20 9 The suggestion is
that employer sanctions will cause employers to deny people with ac-
cents or foreign appearance employment because of the risk that they
may be in the country illegally. 210
Further, it has been suggested that employers may feel even with
fines, it is financially better to employ illegal aliens who are cheaper
laborers.21' One further concern is how such violations would be de-
tected.212 The INS may again be faced with enforcement problems but
of a slightly different nature.
CONCLUSION
The Sureck decision reflects the growing difficulties of reconciling
fourth amendment protection with law enforcement needs.213 The
long-term results of the decision suggest that the INS will have to cur-
tail if not cease their factory sweep operations. Certainly the Ninth
Circuit has perceptively and correctly reasoned that a factory sweep is
so intrusive that it must occur only when the most stringent require-
ments for the protection of fourth amendment rights are met. While
the problem of growing numbers of illegal aliens in this country is of
206. Id. at 663-64.
207. See Goodpaster, supra note 2, at 703-08.
208. Employer Sanctions, supra note 204, at 666. See also Undocumented Mexican Alien, supra
note 200, at 877.
209. See Goodpaster, supra note 2, at 703-08.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. A question arises as to how the INS would know that an employer was hiring illegal
aliens. Conceivably, the INS would still have to enter the factory to determine if illegal aliens had
been hired.
213. The Supreme Court expressed the problem well when it said "[tihe needs of law enforce-
ment stand in constant tension with the Constitution's protections of the individual against certain
exercises of official power. It is precisely the predictability of these pressures that counsels a reso-
lute loyalty to constitutional safeguards." Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273
(1973).
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concern, it cannot weigh more heavily than protection of the rights of
innocent and unsuspecting factory workers.

